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In this paperwediscuss the semantics and properties of the relative belief transform, a prob-
ability transformation of belief functions closely related to the classical plausibility trans-
form. We discuss its rationale in both the probability-bound and Shafer’s interpretations of
belief functions. Even though the resulting probability (as it is the case for the plausibil-
ity transform) is not consistent with the original belief function, an interesting rationale in
terms of optimal strategies in a non-cooperative game can be given in the probability-bound
interpretation to both relative belief and plausibility of singletons. On the other hand, we
prove that relative belief commutes with Dempster’s orthogonal sum, meets a number of
properties which are the duals of those met by the relative plausibility of singletons, and
commutes with convex closure in a similar way to Dempster’s rule. This supports the ar-
gument that relative plausibility and belief transform are indeed naturally associated with
the D-S framework, and highlights a classification of probability transformations into two
families, according to the operator they relate to. Finally, we point out that relative belief is
only a member of a class of “relative mass” mappings, which can be interpreted as low-cost
proxies for both plausibility and pignistic transforms.
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Inc.
1. Introduction
The theory of evidence [38] extends classical probability theory through the notion of belief function, a mathematical
entity which independently assigns probability values to sets of possibilities rather than single events. A belief function
b : 2 → [0, 1] on a finite set or frame  has the form b(A) = ∑B⊆A mb(B), where the functionmb : 2 → [0, 1] (called
basic probability assignment or basic belief assignment b.b.a.) is both non-negative mb(A) ≥ 0 ∀A ⊆  and normalized∑
A⊆ mb(A) = 1.EventsAassociatedwithnon-zerobasicprobabilitiesmb(A) = 0arecalled focal elements. Abasicprobabil-
ity assignmentmb can be uniquely recovered from a belief function b byMoebius transform:mb(A) = ∑B⊆A(−1)|A−B|b(B).
Special belief functions assigning non-zero masses to singletons only (mb(A) = 0 whenever |A| > 1, A ⊆ ) are called
Bayesian belief functions, and are in 1-1 correspondence with probability distributions on . Different operators have been
proposed for the combination of two or more belief functions, starting from the orthogonal sum originally formulated by A.
Dempster [19,18].
Belief functions possess a number of alternative semantics in terms of multi-valued mappings [40], random sets [29,35],
inner measures [26,36], transferable beliefs [45] or hints [32]. One such interpretation is based on the fact that a belief func-
tion corresponds to a set of upper and lower bounds to the values of probability measures on , which in turn determine a
convex set P[b] of such probabilities (often called consistent with b):
P[b] .= {p ∈ P : b(A) ≤ p(A) ≤ plb(A) ∀A ⊆ }, (1)
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where the plausibility function plb : 2 → [0, 1], plb(A) = 1 − b(Ac) = ∑B∩A =∅ mb(B) carries the same evidence as b.
Such interpretation has been criticized as incompatible with Dempster’s rule of combination [52].
On the other hand, in the original model in which belief functions are induced by multi-valued mappings of probability
distributions, Dempster’s conditioning can be judged inappropriate from a Bayesian point of view. In order to deal with such
criticism, in his “Transferable Belief Model” (TBM) [42,45] Smets abandons all notions of multivalued mapping to define
belief directly in terms of basis belief assignments (“credal” level).
1.1. Probability transformation of belief functions
The relation betweenbelief andprobability, in particular, has been an important subject of study in the theory of evidence.
Given a frame of discernment , let us denote by B the set of all belief functions on , and by P the set of all probability
distributions on . According to [17], we call a probability transform of belief functions an operator pt : B → P , b → pt[b]
mapping belief measures onto probability distributions, such that b(x) ≤ pt[b](x) ≤ plb(x) = 1 − b({x}c). Note that such
definition requires the probability which results from the transform to be compatible with the upper and lower bounds
the original belief function b enforces on the singletons only, and not on all the focal sets as in Eq. (1). This is a minimal,
sensible constraint which does not require probability transforms to adhere to the upper-lower probability semantic of
belief functions.
Anumberofpapershavebeenpublishedon the issueofprobability transform[1,22,23,28,33,53,55].Manyof theseproposals
seek efficient implementations of the rule of combination. Tessem [49], for instance, incorporates only the highest-valued
focal elements in hismklx approximation. A similar approach inspires the summarization technique formulated by Lowrance
et al. [34].
A different, decision based approach to probability transformation is at the foundation of the TBM,where decisions aremade
via the pignistic probability
Bet P[b](x) = ∑
A⊇{x}
mb(A)
|A| , (2)
generated by what Smets calls the pignistic transform: BetP : B → P , b → BetP[b]. Initially justified by the Principle of
Insufficient Reason, the pignistic probability is the result of a redistribution process in which the mass of each focal element
A is re-assigned to all its elements x ∈ A on an equal basis, and is perfectly compatible with the upper-lower probability
semantics of belief functions, as it is the center of mass of the polytope (1) of consistent probabilities [4].
Other proposals have been recently brought forward by Dezert et al. [24], Burger [3], Sudano [48] and others, based on
redistribution processes similar to that of the pignistic transform. New Bayesian approximations of belief functions, such as
the orthogonal projection of a belief function b onto the probability simplex:
π [b](x) = ∑
A⊇{x}
mb(A)
(
1 + |Ac|21−|A|
n
)
+ ∑
A ⊃{x}
mb(A)
(
1 − |A|21−|A|
n
)
(3)
have been derived from purely geometric considerations [9] in the context of the geometric approach to the theory of
evidence [11].
1.2. Relative plausibility and belief transforms
Originally developed by Voorbraak [51] as a probabilistic approximation intended to limit the computational cost of
operating with belief functions in the Dempster-Shafer framework, the plausibility transform [5] has later been supported
by Cobb and Shenoy in virtue of its commutativity properties with respect to Dempster’s sum. Even though initially defined
in terms of commonality values, the plausibility transform p˜l : B → P , b → p˜l[b] maps each belief function b to the
probability distribution p˜l[b] = p˜lb obtained by normalizing the plausibility values plb(x) 1 of the element of :
p˜lb(x) = plb(x)∑
y∈ plb(y)
. (4)
We call the output p˜lb (4) of the plausibility transform relative plausibility of singletons. Voorbraak proved that the latter is a
perfect representative of bwhen combined with other probabilities p ∈ P through Dempster’s rule⊕:
p˜lb ⊕ p = b ⊕ p ∀p ∈ P. (5)
1 With a harmless abuse of notation we denote the values of mass, belief and plausibility functions on a singleton x by mb(x), b(x) and plb(x) rather than
mb({x}), b({x}) and plb({x}).
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Dually, a relative belief transform b˜ : B → P , b → b˜[b] mapping each belief function to the corresponding relative belief of
singletons b˜[b] = b˜ [10,13,27,17]
b˜(x) = b(x)∑
y∈ b(y)
(6)
can be defined. Unlike the relative plausibility of singletons, however, b˜[b] exists iff b assigns some mass to singleton focal
sets: ∑
x∈
mb(x) = 0. (7)
The notion of relative belief transform (under the name of “normalized belief of singletons”) has first been proposed by
Daniel [17]. Some preliminary analyses of the relative belief transform and its close relationship with the (relative) plausi-
bility transform have been presented in [10,13].
Whatever the rationale for proposing a probability transformation of belief functions (decision making, as in the pignistic
transform, or computational burden inmany other cases), there aremanyways of investigating its design: geometrical prop-
erties, principle of insufficient reason, commutativity properties, etcetera. Adetaileddiscussionof the geometrical properties
of b˜ and p˜l, for instance, has been given in [14]. Here we focus on commutativity properties, making a distinction between
transforms which commute with respect to affine combination of belief functions (pignistic and orthogonal probabilities),
and those which commute with respect to Dempster’s rule (and therefore are consistent with the original Dempster-Shafer
framework): relative plausibility and belief transform. This outlines a classification of probability transformations into two
classes, according to the operator they commute with.
1.3. Paper contribution and outline
As belief functions have different, rather conflicting interpretations, in Section 2 we discuss the semantics of relative
belief and plausibility in both the probability-bound and Shafer’s interpretations of the theory.Within the probability-bound
interpretation (Section 2.1), as neither transforms are associatedwith a valid redistribution of themass of the focal elements
to the singletons, it is easy to prove that they are not consistent with the original belief function. However, an interesting
betting semantic for such transforms in this interpretation can be provided in an adversarial game theory scenario [50]
in which an opponent is free to pick any probability function in the set determined by a belief function, and the decision
maker’s goal is to maximize their minimal reward (or minimize their maximal loss). In Shafer’s formulation of the theory of
evidence as an evidence combination process, arguments similar to those formulated for the plausibility transform can be
resorted to in the case of the relative belief transform (Section 2.2).
Indeed, as we argue here, the relative plausibility and belief transforms are closely related probability transformations
(Section 3). Not only the latter can be seen as the relative plausibility of singletons of the associated plausibility function
(Section 3.2), but both transformsmeet a number of dual properties with respect to Dempster’s rule of combination (Section
3.3). In particular, while p˜lb commutes with Dempster’s sum of belief functions, b˜ commutes with the orthogonal sum of
plausibility functions. Similarly, while p˜lb perfectly represents the belief function b when combined with any probability
distribution (5), b˜ perfectly represents the associated plausibility function plb when combined with a probability through the
natural extension of Dempster’s sum (Section 3.4). Such a duality is illustrated in the following table:
b ↔ plb
p˜lb ↔ b˜
b ⊕ p = p˜lb ⊕ p ∀p ↔ plb ⊕ p = b˜ ⊕ p ∀p
p˜lb[b1 ⊕ b2] = p˜lb[b1] ⊕ p˜lb[b2] ↔ b˜[plb1 ⊕ plb2 ] = b˜[plb1 ] ⊕ b˜[plb2 ].
This outlines the classification of probability transformations into two major classes: those commuting with affine combi-
nation versus those commuting with Dempster’s rule (Section 3.5). The behavior of the plausibility transform w.r.t. affine
combination, closely mimicking that of Dempster’s rule itself, confirms that this second family is indeed more consistent
with the original Dempster-Shafer framework.
The symmetry/duality between (relative) plausibility and belief is broken, however, as the existence of the relative belief of
singletons is subject to a strong condition (7), stressing the issue of its applicability (Section 4). Even though this situation
is “singular” (in the sense that it excludes most belief and probability measures, Section 4.1), in practice the situation in
which the mass of all singletons is nil is common. In Section 4.2, however, we point out that relative belief is only a member
of a class of relative mass transformations, which can be interpreted as low-cost proxies for both plausibility and pignistic
transforms (4.3). We discuss their applicability as approximate transformations in two significant scenarios.
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2. Rationale of relative belief and plausibility of singletons in two interpretations of the theory of evidence
The original semantic of belief functions derives from Dempster’s analysis of the effect of multi-valued mappings  :
 → 2, x ∈  → (x) ⊆  on evidence available in the form of a probability distribution on a “top” domain  on a
“bottom” decision set . As such, belief values are probabilities of events implying other events. In some of his papers [20],
however, Dempster himself claimed that themassmb(A) associated with a non-singleton event A ⊆  could be understood
as a “floating probability mass” which could not be attached to any particular singleton event x ∈ A because of the lack of
precision of the (multi-valued) operator that quantifies our knowledge via the mass function. This has originated a popular
but controversial interpretation of belief functions as coherent sets of probabilities determined by sets of lower and upper
bounds to their probability values.
As Shafer admits, there is a sense in which a single belief function can indeed be interpreted as a consistent system of
probability bounds. However, the issue with this probability-bound interpretation becomes evident when considering two
or more belief functions addressing the same question but representing conflicting items of evidence, i.e., when Dempster’s
rule is applied to aggregate evidence. In [38,39], Shafer disavowed any probability-bound interpretation, a position later
seconded by Dempster [21].
We will come back to this point in Section 2.2, in which we will link the relative belief transform to Cobb and Shenoy’s
arguments [5] in favor of the plausibility transform as a link between Shafer’s theory of evidence (endowedwith Dempster’s
rule) and Bayesian reasoning. To corroborate this argument, in Section 2.1 we show that both plausibility and relative belief
transforms (unlike Smets’ pignistic transform) are not consistentwith a probability-bound interpretation of belief functions.
Even in this scenario, however, a rationale for such transformations can be given via a utility theoretical argument, as in the
case of the pignistic probability.
2.1. A game theoretical semantic within the probability-bound interpretation
In their static, probability-bound interpretation, belief functions b : 2 → [0, 1] determine each a convex set P[b] of
“consistent” probability distributions (1).
It can be proven that a probability distribution on is consistent with b in the above way iff it is the result of a redistribution
process, in which the mass of each focal element is shared between its elements in an arbitrary proportion [12]. One such
probability is central in Smets’ Transferable Belief Model, in which decisions are made at the pignistic level by applying the
pignistic transform to convert the available belief function into a probability distribution. The nature of the mapping was
originally based on the Principle of Insufficient Reason (PIR) proposed by Bernoulli, Laplace, and Keynes, which states that
“if there is no known reason for predicating of our subject one rather than another of several alternatives, then relatively to
such knowledge the assertions of each of these alternatives have an equal probability”.
A direct consequence of the PIR2 in the probability-bound interpretation of belief functions is that, when considering how
to redistribute the mass of an event A, it is wise to assume equiprobability amongst its singletons. This yields exactly the
pignistic transform (2).
It is easy to prove that relative belief and plausibility of singletons are not the result of such a redistribution process, and
therefore are not consistent with the original belief function in the sense defined above. Indeed, the relative plausibility of
singletons (4) is the result of a process in which:
• for each singleton x ∈  a redistribution process (there could be more than one) is selected in which the mass of all the
events containing it is reassigned to x, yielding {plb(x), x ∈ };• however, as different redistribution processes are supposed to hold for different singletons (many of which belong to the
same higher-size focal elements), this scenario is not compatible with the existence of a single redistribution of mass to
the singletons, as the mass of the same higher cardinality event is assigned to different singletons;
• the obtained plausibility values plb(x), x ∈  are nevertheless normalized to yield a formally admissible probability
distribution.
Similarly, for the relative belief of singletons (6):
• for each singleton x ∈  a redistribution process is selected in which only the mass of {x} itself is re-assigned to x,
yielding {b(x) = mb(x), x ∈ };• once again this scenario does not correspond to a single valid redistribution process, as the mass of all higher-size focal
elements is not assigned to any singletons;
• the obtained values b(x), x ∈  are nevertheless normalized to produce a valid probability.
2 Later on, however, Smets [43] advocated that the PIR could not justify by itself the uniqueness of the pignistic transform, and proposed a justification based
on a number of axioms.
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The fact that both such probability transformations derive from assuming at the same time a number of incompatible
redistribution processes is reflected by the fact that the resulting probability distributions are not guaranteed to belong to
the set of probabilities (1) consistent with b.
Theorem 1. The relative belief of singletons is not always consistent.
Proof. We just need a simple counterexample. Consider a belief function b : 2 → [0, 1] on  = {x1, x2, ..., xn},
kmb
.= ∑x∈ mb(x) the total mass it assigns to singletons, with b.b.a. mb(xi) = kmb/n for all i, mb({x1, x2}) = 1 − kmb .
Then:
b({x1, x2}) = 2 · kmb
n
+ 1 − kmb = 1 − kmb
(
n − 2
n
)
,
b˜(x1) = b˜(x2) = 1
n
⇒ b˜({x1, x2}) = 2
n
.
For b˜ to be consistent with b (Eq. (1)) it is necessary that b˜({x1, x2}) ≥ b({x1, x2}), in other words:
2
n
≥ 1 − kmb
n − 2
n
≡ kmb ≥ 1,
i.e., kmb = 1. If kmb < 1 (b is not a probability) its relative belief of singletons is not consistent. 
A similar counterexample can be found for p˜lb.
Theorem 2. The relative plausibility of singletons is not always consistent.
Proof. Let us pick for sake of simplicity a frame of discernment with just three elements: ={x1, x2, x3}, and the follow-
ing b.b.a.:
mb({xi}c) = k
3
∀i = 1, 2, 3, mb({x1, x2}c) = mb({x3}) = 1 − k.
In this case, the plausibility of {x1, x2} is obviously: plb({x1, x2}) = 1− (1−k) = k, while the plausibilities of the singletons
are: plb(x1) = plb(x2) = 2/3k, plb(x3) = 1− 1/3k. Therefore∑x∈ plb(x) = 1+ k and the relative plausibility values are:
p˜lb(x1) = p˜lb(x2) = 2/3k1+k , p˜lb(x3) = 1−1/3k1+k .
For p˜lb to be consistent with bwe need:
p˜lb({x1, x2}) = p˜lb(x1) + p˜lb(x2) = 4
3
k
1
1 + k ≤ plb({x1, x2}) = k,
which happens if and only if k ≥ 1/3. Therefore, for k < 1/3 p˜lb ∈ P[b]. 
As an additional example, consider a belief function on  = {x1, x2, ..., xn}with two focal elements:
mb(x1) = 0.01, mb({x2, ..., xn}) = 0.99. (8)
This can be interpreted as the following real-world situation. A number of people x2, ..., xn have no money of their own
but they are all candidates to inherit the wealth of a very rich relative. Person x1 is not, but has some little money of their
own. Note that it is not correct to interpret x2, ..., xn as assured, joint owners of a certain wealth (say, shares of the same
company), as (8) is indeed consistent (in the probability-bound interpretation) with a distributionwhich assigns probability
0.99 to a single person of the group x2, ..., xn.
The relative belief of singletons associated with (8) is the distribution with b˜(x1) = 1, b˜(xi) = 0 for i = 2, ..., n. Clearly this
is not a good representative of the set of probabilities consistent with the above belief function, as it does not contemplate
at all the chance all the heirs x2, ..., xn have to gain a remarkable amount of money. Indeed, according to Theorem 1, b˜ in
this example is not at all consistent with (8).
What b˜ and p˜lb do is to set respectively a lower and an upper bound to the probability values for each element x ∈  of
the frame under the constraint represented by the belief function b, as in Dempster’s original interpretation.
However, even though in the probability-bound interpretation the two transforms do not appear as valid approximations
of belief functions, an interesting interpretation for them can be provided in a game/utility theory context [30,46,50]. The
argument we propose here recalls somehow the betting rationale for the pignistic transform in the TBM [54], where a MAP
decision is taken at the pignistic level as follows:
x∗ = arg max
x∈
{
BetP[b] (x) }.
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Fig. 1. The modified carnival wheel, in which part of the spinning wheel is cloaked.
In expected utility theory [50], a decision maker can choose between a number of “lotteries” (probability distributions) Li
in order to maximize their expected return or utility calculated as
E(Li) =
∑
x∈
u(x) · pi(x),
where u is a utility function u :  → R+ which measures the relative satisfaction (for us) of the different outcomes x ∈ 
of the lottery, and pi(x) is the probability of x under lottery Li.
Consider instead the following game theory scenario, inspired by Strat’s expected utility approach to decision making
with belief functions [47,37].
In a country fair, people are asked to bet on one of the possible outcomes of a spinning carnival wheel. Suppose the outcomes
are {♣,♦,♥,♠}, and that they each have the same utility (return) to the player. This is equivalent to a lottery (probability
distribution), in which each outcome has a probability proportional to the area of the corresponding sectors on the wheel.
However, the fair manager decides to make the game more interesting by covering part of the wheel. Players are still asked
to bet on a single outcome, knowing that the manager is allowed to rearrange the hidden sector of the wheel as he pleases
(see Figure 1). Clearly, this situation can be described as a belief function, in particular one in which the fraction of area
associated with the hidden sector is assigned as mass to the whole decision space {♣,♦,♥,♠}. If additional (partial)
information is provided, for instance that ♦ cannot appear in the hidden sector, different belief functions must be chosen
instead.
Regardless the particular belief function b (set of probabilities) at hand, the rule allowing themanager to pick an arbitrary
distribution of outcomes in the hidden section mathematically translates into allowing him/her to choose any probability
distribution p ∈ P[b] consistent with b in order to damage the player. Supposing the aim of the player is to maximize their
minimal chance of winning the bet, which outcome (singleton) should they pick?
In the probability-bound interpretation, the belief value of each singleton x ∈ measures theminimal support x can receive
from a distribution of the family P[b] associated with the belief function b:
b(x) = min
p∈P[b] p(x).
Hence xmaximin
.= arg maxx∈ b(x) is the outcome which maximizes such minimal support. In the example of Figure 1, as♣ is the outcome which occupies the largest share of the visible part of the wheel, the safest bet (the one which guarantees
the maximal chance in the worst case) is indeed ♣. Formally, ♣ is the singleton with the largest belief value. Now, if we
normalize to compute the relative belief of singletons this outcome is obviously conserved:
xmaximin = arg max
x∈ b˜(x) = arg maxx∈ minp∈P[b] p(x).
In conclusion, if the utility function is constant (i.e., if no element of can be preferred over the others), xmaximin (the peak(s)
of the relative belief of singletons) represents the best possible defensive strategy aimed at maximizing the minimal utility
of the possible outcomes.
Dually, plb(x) measures the maximal possible support to x by a distribution consistent with b, so that
xminimax = arg min
x∈ p˜lb(x) = arg minx∈ maxp∈P[b] p(x)
is the outcome which minimizes the maximal possible support.
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Suppose for sake of simplicity that the loss function l :  → R+ which measures the relative dissatisfaction of the
outcomes is constant, and that in the same game theory setup our opponent is (again) free to pick a consistent probability
distribution p ∈ P[b]. Then the element with minimal relative plausibility is the best possible defensive strategy aimed at
minimizing the maximum possible loss.
Note that when the utility/loss function is not constant the above minimax and maximin problems naturally generalize as:
xmaximin = arg maxx∈ b˜(x)u(x), xminimax = arg minx∈ p˜lb(x)l(x).
While in classical utility theory the decision maker has to select the best “lottery” (probability distribution) in order to
maximize the expected utility, here the “lottery” is chosen by his/her opponent (given the available partial evidence), and
the decision maker is left with Picking the safest strategy (element of). Relative belief and plausibility of singletons play a
crucial role in determining the safest strategy in an adversarial scenario in which the decision maker has to minimize their
maximal loss/maximize their minimal return.
2.2. Semantics within Shafer’s interpretation
Shafer has strongly argued against a probability-bound interpretation of belief functions. When these are not taken in
isolation but as pieces of evidence to combine, such an interpretation forces us to consider only groups of belief functions
whose degrees of belief, when interpreted as probability bounds, can be satisfied simultaneously (in otherwords, when their
sets of consistent probabilities have non-empty intersection). In Shafer’s (and Shenoy’s) view, though, when belief functions
are combined via Dempster’s rule this is irrelevant, even though consistent probabilities that simultaneously bound all the
belief functions being combined as well as the resulting belief function do exist when no renormalization is required in
their Dempster’s combination. Consequently, citing Shafer, authors who support a probability-bound interpretation of be-
lief functions are uncomfortable with renormalization [56].
In this context, Cobb and Shenoy [5] have argued in favor of the plausibility transform as a link between Shafer’s theory
of evidence (endowed with Dempster’s rule) and Bayesian reasoning. Besides some general arguments supporting proba-
bility transformations of belief functions in general, their points more specifically about the plausibility transform can be
summarized as follows:
• a probability transformation consistent with Dempster’s rule can improve our understanding of the theory of evidence
by providing probabilistic semantics for belief functions, i.e., “meanings” of basic probability assignments in the context
of betting for hypotheses in the frame ;
• in opposition to some literature on belief functions suggesting that the theory of evidence is more expressive than
probability theory (since the probability model obtained by using the pignistic transformation leads to non-intuitive
results [2]), they show that by using the plausibility transformation method the original belief function model and the
corresponding probability model yield the same qualitative results;
• a probability transformation consistent with Dempster’s rule allows to build probabilistic models by converting/
transforming belief function models obtained by using the belief function semantics of distinct evidence [41].
Mathematically, they proved [7] that the plausibility transform commutes with Dempster’s rule, and meets a number of
additional properties which they claim “allow an integration of Bayesian and D-S reasoning that takes advantage of the
efficiency in computation and decision-making provided by Bayesian calculus while retaining the flexibility in modeling
evidence that underlies D-S reasoning”.
In this paper we prove that a similar set of (dual) properties hold for the relative belief transform, associating relative belief
and relative plausibility transforms in a family of probability transformations strongly related to Shafer’s interpretation of
the theory of evidence via Dempster’s rule.
3. Duality
Relative belief and plausibility of singletons are, as we show here, linked by a form of duality, as b˜ can be interpreted as
the relative plausibility of singletons of the plausibility function plb associated with b. Furthermore, b˜ and p˜lb share a close
relationship with Dempster’s evidence combination rule ⊕, as they meet a set of dual properties with respect to ⊕. This
suggests a classification of all the probability transformations of belief functions in terms of the operator they relate to.
3.1. Relative plausibility, Dempster’s rule, and pseudo belief functions
Definition 1. The orthogonal sum or Dempster’s sum of two belief functions b1, b2 : 2 → [0, 1] is a new belief function
b1 ⊕ b2 : 2 → [0, 1] with b.b.a.:
mb1⊕b2(A) =
∑
B∩C=A mb1(B) mb2(C)∑
B∩C =∅ mb1(B) mb2(C)
, (9)
where mbi denotes the b.b.a. associated with bi.
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We denote by k(b1, b2) the denominator of Eq. (9).
Cobb and Shenoy [7] proved that the relative plausibility function p˜lb commutes with Dempster’s rule, and meets a number
of additional properties 3 .
Proposition 1. (1) If b = b1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ bm then p˜lb = p˜lb1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ p˜lbm : Dempster’s sum and relative plausibility commute.
(2) If mb is idempotent with respect to Dempster’s rule, i.e. mb ⊕mb = mb, then p˜lb is idempotent with respect to Bayes’ rule.
(3) Let us define the limit of a belief function b as
b∞ .= lim
n→∞ b
n .= lim
n→∞
(
b ⊕ · · · ⊕ b) (n times); (10)
if ∃x ∈  such that plb(x) > plb(y) for all y = x, y ∈ , then p˜lb∞(x) = 1, p˜lb∞(y) = 0 for all y = x.
(4) If ∃A ⊆  (|A| = k) such that plb(x) = plb(y) for all x, y ∈ A and plb(x) > plb(z) for all x ∈ A, z ∈ Ac, then
p˜lb∞(x) = p˜lb∞(y) = 1/k for all x, y ∈ A, while p˜lb∞(z) = 0 for all z ∈ Ac.
On his side, Voorbraak has shown [51] that.
Proposition 2. The relative plausibility of singletons p˜lb is a perfect representative of b in the probability space when combined
through Dempster’s rule: b ⊕ p = p˜lb ⊕ p, ∀p ∈ P .
The relative belief of singletons meets analogous dual properties. Their study requires first to extend our analysis to a
more general class of objects. Sum functions of the form ς(A) = ∑B⊆A mς (B) whose Moebius transform mς meets the
normalization axiom, ς() = ∑∅A⊆ mς (A) = 1, but is not necessarily non-negative, are called pseudo belief functions
[44].
Plausibility functions are pseudo belief functions too, as they meet the normalization constraint plb() = 1 for all b. Their
Moebius transform [8]
μb(A)
.= ∑
B⊆A
(−1)|A\B|plb(B) = (−1)|A|+1
∑
B⊇A
mb(B), A = ∅ (11)
is called basic plausibility assignment (μb(∅) = 0).
Both belief and plausibility functions can be represented as vectors of a Cartesian space B called belief space [11]. In that
space they can be written as affine combinations of the categorical belief functions bA (such that mbA(A) = 1, mbA(B) = 0∀B = A), with coefficients given by their b.b.a. or basic plausibility assignment, respectively:
b = ∑
∅=A⊆
mb(A)bA, plb =
∑
∅=A⊆
μb(A)bA. (12)
3.2. A (broken) symmetry
A direct consequence of the duality between belief and plausibility measures is the existence of a striking symmetry
between (relative) plausibility and belief transform. A formal proof of this symmetry is based on the following interesting
property of the basic plausibility assignment μb [15].
Lemma 1.
∑
A⊇{x} μb(A) = mb(x).
Theorem 3. Given a pair of belief/plausibility functions b, plb : 2 → [0, 1], the relative belief transform of the belief function
b coincides with the plausibility transform of the associated plausibility function plb (interpreted as a pseudo belief function):
b˜[b] = p˜l[plb].
Proof. Each pseudo belief function admits a (pseudo) plausibility function, as in the case of standard belief functions, which
can be computed as plς (A) = ∑B∩A =∅ mς (B).
For the class of pseudo belief functions ς which correspond to the plausibility of some belief function b (ς = plb for some
b ∈ B), the pseudo plausibility function is plplb(A) =
∑
B∩A =∅ μb(B), as μb (11) is the Moebius inverse of plb.
When applied to the elements x ∈  of the common frame of b, plb this yields plplb(x) =
∑
Bx μb(B) = mb(x) by
3 The original statements from [6] have been reformulated according to the notation of this paper.
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Lemma 1, which implies
p˜l[plb](x) = plplb(x)∑
y∈ plplb(y)
= mb(x)∑
y∈ mb(y)
= b˜[b]. 
The symmetry between relative plausibility and belief of singletons is broken by the fact that the latter is not defined for
belief functions with no singleton focal sets. Since b˜ is itself an instance of relative plausibility (of a plausibility function plb),
and p˜lb always exists, this seems to contradict Theorem 3.
This superficial paradox finds an explanation in the combinatorial nature of belief, plausibility, and commonality functions.
As we proved in [15], while belief measures are sum functions of the form b(A) = ∑B⊂A mb(B) whose Moebius transform
mb is both normalized and non-negative, plausibility measures are sum functions whose Moebius transform μb is not
necessarily non-negative (while commonality functions are not even normalized). Hence, the quantity∑
x
plplb(x) =
∑
x
∑
A⊇{x}
μb(A) =
∑
A⊇
μb(A)|A|
can be equal to zero, in which case p˜lplb = b˜ does not exist.
3.3. Dual properties of the relative belief operator
The duality between b˜ and p˜lb (albeit imperfect to some extent) extends to the transformations’ behavior with respect to
Dempster’s rule of combination (9). We first need to note that the orthogonal sum can be naturally extended to a pair ς1, ς2
of pseudo belief functions too [16], by applying (9) to their Moebius inversesmς1 ,mς2 .
Proposition 3. When applied to a pair of pseudo belief functions ς1, ς2, Dempster’s rule defined as in Eq. (9) yields again a
pseudo belief function.
We still denote the orthogonal sum of two pseudo belief functions ς1, ς2 by ς1⊕ς2. As plausibility functions are pseudo
belief functions, Dempster’s rule can then be formally applied to them as well. We can then prove a dual commutativity
result for relative beliefs. To this purpose, it is convenient to introduce a dual form of the relative belief operator, mapping a
plausibility function to the corresponding relative belief of singletons: b˜ : PL → P , plb → b˜[plb], where PL is the space of
all plausibility functions, and
b˜[plb](x) .= mb(x)∑
y∈ mb(y)
∀x ∈  (13)
is defined as usual for belief functions b such that
∑
y mb(y) = 0.
Indeed, as b and plb are in 1-1 correspondence, we can indifferently define an operator mapping a belief function b to its
relative belief b˜, ormapping the unique plausibility function plb associatedwith b to b˜. The following commutativity theorem
follows, as the dual of point 1) in Proposition 1.
Theorem4. The relative belief operator commuteswith respect toDempster’s combinationof plausibility functions: b˜[pl1⊕pl2] =
b˜[pl1] ⊕ b˜[pl2].
Proof. The basic plausibility assignment of pl1 ⊕ pl2 is, according to (9):
μpl1⊕pl2(A) =
1
k(pl1, pl2)
∑
X∩Y=A
μ1(X)μ2(Y).
Therefore, according to Lemma 1, the corresponding relative belief of singletons b˜[pl1 ⊕ pl2](x) (13) is proportional
to:
mpl1⊕pl2(x) =
∑
A⊇{x}
μpl1⊕pl2(A) =
∑
A⊇{x}
∑
X∩Y=A μ1(X)μ2(Y)
k(pl1, pl2)
=
∑
X∩Y⊇{x} μ1(X)μ2(Y)
k(pl1, pl2)
, (14)
wherempl1⊕pl2(x) denotes the b.b.a. of the (pseudo) belief function which corresponds to the plausibility function pl1 ⊕ pl2.
On the other hand, as
∑
X⊇{x} μb(X) = mb(x):
b˜[pl1](x) ∝ m1(x) =
∑
X⊇{x}
μ1(X), b˜[pl2](x) ∝ m2(x) =
∑
X⊇{x}
μ2(X).
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Their Dempster’s combination is therefore:
(b˜[pl1] ⊕ b˜[pl2])(x) ∝
⎛
⎝ ∑
X⊇{x}
μ1(X)
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎝ ∑
Y⊇{x}
μ2(Y)
⎞
⎠ = ∑
X∩Y⊇{x}
μ1(X)μ2(Y),
and by normalizing we get (14). 
Theorem 4 implies that
b˜[(plb)n] = (b˜[plb])n. (15)
As an immediate consequence, an idempotence property which is the dual of point 2) of Proposition 1 holds for the relative
belief of singletons.
Corollary 1. If plb is idempotent with respect to Dempster’s rule, i.e. plb ⊕ plb = plb, then b˜[plb] is itself idempotent: b˜[plb] ⊕
b˜[plb] = b˜[plb].
Proof. By Theorem 4 b˜[plb] ⊕ b˜[plb] = b˜[plb ⊕ plb], and if plb ⊕ plb = plb the thesis immediately follows. 
The dual results of the remaining two statements of Proposition 1 can be proven in a similar fashion.
Theorem 5. If ∃x ∈  such that b(x) > b(y) ∀y = x, y ∈ , then
b˜[pl∞b ](x) = 1, b˜[pl∞b ](y) = 0 ∀y = x.
Proof. Taking the limit on both sides of Eq. (15) we get
b˜[pl∞b ] = (b˜[plb])∞. (16)
Let us consider the quantity (b˜[plb])∞ = limn→∞(b˜[plb])n on the right hand side. Since (b˜[plb])n(x) = K(b(x))n (where K
is a constant independent from x), and x is the unique most believed state, it follows that
(b˜[plb])∞(x) = 1, (b˜[plb])∞(y) = 0 ∀y = x. (17)
Hence by (16) b˜[pl∞b ](x) = 1, and b˜[pl∞b ](y) = 0 for all y = x. 
A similar proof can be given for the following generalization of Theorem 5.
Corollary 2. If ∃A ⊆  (|A| = k) s.t. b(x) = b(y) ∀x, y ∈ A, b(x) > b(z) ∀x ∈ A, z ∈ Ac, then
b˜[pl∞b ](x) = b˜[pl∞b ](y) = 1/k ∀x, y ∈ A, b˜[pl∞b ](z) = 0 ∀z ∈ Ac.
It is crucial to point out that commutativity (Theorem4) and idempotence (Corollary 1) hold for combinations of plausibil-
ity functions, andnot of belief functions. Consider as anexample thebelief functionbon the frameof size four = {x, y, z,w}
determined by the following basic probability assignment:
mb({x, y}) = 0.4, mb({y, z}) = 0.4, mb(w) = 0.2. (18)
Its basic plausibility assignment is, according to (11), given by:
μb(x) = 0.4, μb(y) = 0.8, μb(z) = 0.4,
μb(w) = 0.2, μb({x, y}) = −0.4, μb({y, z}) = −0.4.
(19)
To check the validity of Theorems 4 and 5 let us analyze the two series (b˜[plb])n and b˜[(plb)n]. By applying Dempster’s rule to
the basic plausibility assignment (19) (pl2b = plb ⊕ plb) we get a new basic plausibility assignment μ2b with values μ2b(x) =
4/7, μ2b(y) = 8/7, μ2b(z) = 4/7, μ2b(w) = −1/7, μ2b({x, y}) = −4/7, μ2b({y, z}) = −4/7 (see Figure 2). To compute the
corresponding relative belief of singletons b˜[pl2b]we first need to get the plausibility values:
pl2b({x, y, z}) = μ2b(x) + μ2b(y) + μ2b(z) + μ2b({x, y}) + μ2b({y, z}) = 8/7,
pl2b({x, y,w}) = 1, pl2b({x, z,w}) = 1, pl2b({y, z,w}) = 1,
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Fig. 2. Intersection of focal elements in Dempster’s combination of the basic plausibility assignment (19) with itself. Non-zero mass events for each addendum
μ1 = μ2 = μb correspond to rows/columns of the table, each entry of the table hosting the related intersection.
which imply (by definition plb(A)
.= 1 − b(Ac)): b2(w) = −1/7, b2(z) = b2(y) = b2(x) = 0, i.e., b˜[pl2b] = [0, 0, 0, 1]′
(representing probability distributions as vectors of the form [p(x), p(y), p(z), p(w)]′).
Theorem 4 is confirmed as, by (18) (being {w} the only singleton with non-zero mass), b˜ = [0, 0, 0, 1]′ so that b˜ ⊕ b˜ =
[0, 0, 0, 1]′ and b˜[.] commuteswith plb⊕. By combining pl2b with plb onemore timewe get the basic plausibility assignment:
μ3b(x) = 16/31, μ3b(y) = 32/31, μ3b(z) = 16/31, μ3b(w) = −1/31,
μ3b({x, y}) = −16/31, μ3b({y, z}) = −16/31,
which corresponds to pl3b({x, y, z}) = 32/31, pl3b({x, y,w}) = 1, pl3b({x, z,w}) = 1, pl3b({y, z,w}) = 1, i.e.: b3(w) =
−1/31, b3(z) = b3(y) = b3(x) = 0, and b˜[pl3b] = [0, 0, 0, 1]′, which again is equal to b˜ ⊕ b˜ ⊕ b˜ as Theorem 4 guarantees.
The series of basic plausibility assignments (μb)
n clearly converges to:
μnb(x) → 1/2+, μ3b(y) → 1+, μ3b(z) → 1/2+, μ3b(w) → 0−,
μ3b({x, y}) → −1/2−, μ3b({y, z}) → −1/2−,
associated with the following plausibility values: limn→∞ plnb({x, y, z}) = 1+, plnb({x, y,w}) = plnb({x, z,w}) = plnb
({y, z,w}) = 1 ∀n ≥ 1, which in turn correspond to the following values of belief of singletons: limn→∞ bn(w) = 0−,
bn(z) = bn(y) = bn(x) = 0 ∀n ≥ 1. Therefore:
limn→∞ b˜[pl∞b ](w) = limn→∞ b
n(w)
bn(w)
= 1,
limn→∞ b˜[pl∞b ](x) = limn→∞ b˜[pl∞b ](y) = limn→∞ b˜[pl∞b ](z)
= limn→∞ 0bn(w) = limn→∞ 0 = 0,
in perfect agreement with Theorem 5.
3.4. Representation theorem for relative beliefs
A dual of the representation theorem (Proposition 2) for the relative belief transform can also be proven, once we recall
a useful result on Dempster’s sum of affine combinations [16].
Proposition 4. The orthogonal sum b⊕∑i αibi,∑i αi = 1 of a belief function bwith any 4 affine combination of belief functions
is itself an affine combination of the partial sums b ⊕ bi, namely:
b ⊕∑
i
αibi =
∑
i
γi(b ⊕ bi), (20)
where γi = αik(b,bi)∑
j αjk(b,bj)
and k(b, bi) is the normalization factor of the partial Dempster’s sum b ⊕ bi.
4 In fact the collection {bi} is required to include at least a belief function which is combinable with b, [16].
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Again, the duality between b˜ and p˜lb implies that the relative belief of singletons represents the associated plausibility
function plb, and not the corresponding belief function b: b˜ ⊕ p = b ⊕ p.
Theorem 6. The relative belief of singletons b˜ represents perfectly the corresponding plausibility function plb when combined
with a probability via (extended) Dempster’s rule: b˜ ⊕ p = plb ⊕ p for each Bayesian belief function p ∈ P .
Proof. In virtue of Eq. (12) we can express a plausibility function as an affine combination of all the categorical belief
functions bA. We can then apply the commutativity property (20), obtaining:
plb ⊕ p =
∑
A⊆
ν(A)p ⊕ bA (21)
where ν(A) = μb(A)k(p,bA)∑
B⊆ μb(B)k(p,bB) and p ⊕ bA =
∑
x∈A p(x)bx
k(p,bA)
, with k(p, bA) = ∑x∈A p(x). Once replaced these expressions in
(21) we get: plb ⊕ p =
=
∑
A⊆ μb(A) (
∑
x∈A p(x)bx)∑
B⊆ μb(B)
(∑
y∈B p(y)
) =
∑
x∈ p(x)
(∑
A⊇{x} μb(A)
)
bx∑
y∈ p(y)
(∑
B⊇{y} μb(B)
) =
∑
x∈ p(x)mb(x)bx∑
y∈ p(y)mb(y)
,
once again by Lemma 1. But this is exactly b˜ ⊕ p, as a direct application of Dempster’s rule (9) shows. 
Theorem 6 can be obtained from Proposition 2 by replacing bwith plb and p˜lb with b˜ in virtue of their duality. It is natural
to suppose other properties of upper probabilities could in the future be found by analogous transformations of known
propositions on lower probabilities, as a useful mathematical characterization of the relation between them.
Once again, the representation theorem 6 is about combinations of plausibility functions (as pseudo belief functions) and
not combinations of proper belief functions. Going back to the previous example, the combination b⊕ b of bwith itself has
b.b.a.:
mb⊕b({x, y}) = mb({x, y}) · mb({x, y})
k(b, b)
= 0.16
0.68
= 0.235,
mb⊕b({y, z}) = mb({y, z}) · mb({y, z})
k(b, b)
= 0.16
0.68
= 0.235,
mb⊕b(w) = mb(w) · mb(w)
k(b, b)
= 0.04
0.68
= 0.058,
mb⊕b(y) = mb({x, y}) · mb({y, z}) + mb({y, z}) · mb({x, y})
k(b, b)
= 0.47,
which obviously yields b˜ ⊕ b =
[
0, 0.47
0.528
, 0, 0.058
0.528
]′ = b˜ ⊕ b˜ = [0, 0, 0, 1]′.
The basic reason for that is that the plausibility function of a sum of two belief functions is not the sum of the associated
plausibilities: [plb1 ⊕ plb2 ] = plb1⊕b2 .
3.5. Two families of probability transforms
The following table summarizes the duality results we just presented:
b ↔ plb
p˜lb ↔ b˜
b ⊕ p = p˜lb ⊕ p ∀p ∈ P ↔ plb ⊕ p = b˜ ⊕ p ∀p ∈ P
p˜lb[b1 ⊕ b2] = p˜lb[b1] ⊕ p˜lb[b2] ↔ b˜[plb1 ⊕ plb2 ] = b˜[plb1 ] ⊕ b˜[plb2 ]
b ⊕ b = b  p˜l[b] ⊕ p˜l[b] = p˜l[b] ↔ plb ⊕ plb = plb  b˜[plb] ⊕ b˜[plb] = b˜[plb].
Note that, just as Voorbraak’s and Cobb’s results are not valid for all pseudo belief functions but only for proper belief
functions, the above dual results do not hold for all pseudo belief functions either, but only for those pseudo belief functions
which are plausibility functions. Once we recall that [9].
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Proposition 5. Both pignistic BetP[b] and orthogonalπ [b] transform (3) commutewith respect to affine combination.Whenever∑
i αi = 1 we have that:
π
⎡
⎣∑
i
αibi
⎤
⎦ = ∑
i
αiπ [bi], BetP
⎡
⎣∑
i
αibi
⎤
⎦ = ∑
i
αiBetP[bi].
we realize that we can in fact distinguish two families of probability transformations, determined by their behavior with
respect to two operators acting on belief functions: affine combination (in the space of belief functions) and Dempster’s rule
[38,19,18].
The notion that there exist two distinct families of probability transformations, each determined by the operator they
commute with, was already implicitly present in the literature. Smets’ linearity axiom [45], which lays at the foundation of
the pignistic transform, obviously corresponds (even though expressed in a somewhat different language) to commutativity
with affine combination of belief functions. To address the criticism such axiom was subject to, Smets introduced later its
formal justification based on an expected utility argument in the presence of conditional evidence [43].
On the other hand, Cobb and Shenoy defended the commutativity with respect of Dempster’s rule, on the basis that
the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence is a coherent framework of which Dempster’s rule is an integral part, and that
a Dempster-compatible transformation can provide a useful probabilistic semantic for belief functions.
Incidentally, there seems to be a flaw in Smets’ argument that the pignistic transform is uniquely determined as the
probability transformationwhich commuteswith affine combination: in [9]we indeedproved that the orthogonal transform
(3) also enjoys the same property.
Analogously, we showed here that the plausibility transform is not unique as a probability transformation which commutes
with⊕ (even though, in this latter case, the transformation is applied to different objects).
We add a further element to this debate here, by proving that the plausibility transform, even though it does not obviously
commute with affine combination, does commute with the convex closure (22) of belief functions in the belief space B:
Cl(b1, ..., bk) =
⎧⎨
⎩b ∈ B : b = α1b1 + · · · + αkbk,
∑
i
αi = 1, αi ≥ 0 ∀i
⎫⎬
⎭ . (22)
The two facts are not in contradiction: as a matter of fact, the behavior of the plausibility transform in this respect reflects
a similar behavior by Dempster’s rule (proved in [16]), supporting the argument that the plausibility transform is indeed
naturally associated with the D-S framework.
Let us first understand its relation with affine combination.
Lemma 2. For all α ∈ R we have that:
p˜l
[
αb1 + (1 − α)b2] = β1p˜l[b1] + β2p˜l[b2],
where
β1 = αkpl1
αkpl1 + (1 − α)kpl2
, β2 = αkpl2
αkpl1 + (1 − α)kpl2
.
Proof. By definition, the plausibility values of the affine combination αb1 + (1 − α)b2 are pl[αb1 + (1 − α)b2](x) =
= ∑
A⊇{x}
mαb1+(1−α)b2(A) =
∑
A⊇{x}
[
αm1(A) + (1 − α)m2(A)]
= α ∑
A⊇{x}
m1(A) + (1 − α)
∑
A⊇{x}
m2(A) = αpl1(x) + (1 − α)pl2(x).
Hence, after denoting by kpli =
∑
y∈ pli(y) the total plausibility of the singletons w.r.t. bi, the values of the relative
plausibility of singletons can be computed as: p˜l[αb1 + (1 − α)b2](x) =
= αpl1(x) + (1 − α)pl2(x)∑
y∈[αpl1(y) + (1 − α)pl2(y)] =
αpl1(x) + (1 − α)pl2(x)
αkpl1 + (1 − α)kpl2
= αpl1(x)
αkpl1 + (1 − α)kpl2
+ (1 − α)pl2(x)
αkpl1 + (1 − α)kpl2
= αkpl1
αkpl1 + (1 − α)kpl2
p˜l1(x) + (1 − α)kpl2
αkpl1 + (1 − α)kpl2
p˜l2(x).
= β1p˜l1(x) + β2p˜l2(x). 
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Theorem 7. The relative plausibility operator commutes with convex closure in the belief space: whenever b1, ..., bm ∈ B are
belief functions defined on the same frame, p˜l[Cl(b1, ..., bm)] = Cl(p˜l[b1], ..., p˜l[bm]).
Proof. The proof follows the structure of that of Theorem 3 and Corollary 3 in [16], on the commutativity of Dempster’s rule
and convex closure.
Formally, we need to prove that:
(1) whenever b = ∑k αkbk , αk ≥ 0,∑k αk = 1, we have that p˜l[b] = ∑k βkp˜l[bk] for some convex coefficients βk;
(2) whenever p ∈ Cl(p˜l[bk], k) (i.e., p = ∑k βkp˜l[bk] with βk ≥ 0,∑k βk = 1), there exists a set of convex coefficients
αk ≥ 0,∑k αk = 1 such that p = p˜l[∑k αkbk].
Point (1) follows directly from Lemma 2. Proving (2), instead, is equivalent to proving that there exist αk ≥ 0,∑k αk = 1
such that:
βk = αkkplk∑
j αjkplj
∀k = 1, ...,m, (23)
which is equivalent to:
αk = βk
kplk
·∑
j
αjkplj ∝
βk
kplk
∀k = 1, ...,m,
as
∑
j αjkplj does not depend on k. If we pick αk = βkkplk the system (23) is met: by further normalization we obtain as
desired. 
It is left to future work to complete this analysis, and check whether other transforms commute with either affine
combination or Dempster’s rule, therefore enriching our understanding of the two families of transformations.
4. Generalizations of the relative belief operator
A serious issue with the relative belief of singletons is its applicability. In opposition to relative plausibility, b˜ does not
exist for a large class of belief functions (those which assign no mass to singletons). Even though this singular case involves
only a small fraction of all belief measures (Section 4.1), this issue arises in many practical cases, for instance when using
fuzzy membership functions to model the evidence.
4.1. Zero mass to singletons as a singular case
In the binary case = {x, y}, according to (7) the only belief functionwhich does not admit a relative belief of singletons
is the vacuous one b: mb() = 1. Its b.b.a. is mb(x) = mb(y) = 0 so that
∑
x mb(x) = 0 and b˜ does not exist.
Symmetrically, the pseudo belief function ς = plb (for which plb(x) = plb(y) = 1) is such that plplb = b, so that
p˜lplb
does not exist. Figure 3-left illustrates the location of b˜ in the simple binary case (in which each pseudo belief function
can be represented as a vector of R2), and those of the dual singular points b, ς = plb .
As illustrated by the binary case, the set of belief functions forwhich b˜does not exist is a lower-dimensional fraction of the set
B of all belief functions. To prove this, let us compute the region spanned by the most common probability transformations:
the plausibility and the pignistic transforms.
Theorem 7 proves that the plausibility transform commutes with convex closure (22). As (by Proposition 4, [9]) the pignistic
transform (2) commutes with affine combination, we have that BetP also commutes with Cl:
BetP[Cl(b1, ..., bm)] = Cl(BetP[bi], i = 1, ...,m).
In the case of both transformations, therefore, to determine the image of any convex set Cl(b1, ..., bm) of belief functions
it is sufficient to compute the transformations of its vertices. The space of all belief functions B .= {b : 2 → [0, 1]}, in
particular, is the convex closure of all the categorical belief functions bA: B = Cl(bA, A ⊆ ) [11].
The image of a categorical belief function bA (a vertex of B) under either plausibility or pignistic transform is:
p˜lbA(x) =
∑
B⊇{x} mbA(B)∑
B⊇{x} mbA(B)|B|
=
⎧⎨
⎩
1
|A| x ∈ A
0 else
.= PA =
∑
B⊇{x}
mbA(B)
|B| = BetP[bA](x),
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Fig. 3. Left: belief functions b = [mb(x),mb(y)]′ and plausibility functions plb = [plb(x) = 1 − mb(y), plb(y) = 1 − mb(x)]′ on  = {x, y} can be represented
as points of R2 [11]. The locations of b˜ =
[
mb(x)
mb(x)+mb(y) ,
mb(y)
mb(x)+mb(y)
]′
and the singular points b = [0, 0]′ and plb = [1, 1]′ are shown. Right: For the class of
belief functions {b : ∑x mb(x) = 0}, pignistic function and relative plausibility are allowed to span only a proper subset of the probability simplex (delimited by
dashed lines in the ternary case  = {x, y, z}).
so that BetP[B] = Cl(BetP[bA], A ⊆ ) = Cl(PA, A ⊆ ) = P = p˜l[B]. The outputs of both pignistic and relative
plausibility transforms span the whole probability simplex P .
Consider, however, the set of (singular) belief functions which assign zeromass to singletons. They live in Cl(bA, |A| > 1) as,
according to Eq. (12) they have the form b = ∑|A|>1 mb(A)bA, withmb(A) ≥ 0,∑|A|>1 mb(A) = 1. The region of P spanned
by their probability transforms is therefore:
p˜l[Cl(bA, |A| > 1)] = Cl(p˜lbA , |A| > 1) = Cl(PA, |A| > 1)
= Cl(BetP[bA], |A| > 1) = BetP[Cl(bA, |A| > 1)].
The result is illustrated by Figure 3-right in the ternary case = {x, y, z}. If (7) is not met, both probability transformations
span only a limited region
Cl(P{x,y},P{x,z},P{y,z},P) = Cl(P{x,y},P{x,z},P{y,z})
of the probability simplex (the triangle delimited by dashed lines in Figure 3-right).
4.2. The family of relative mass probability transformations
Onemay argue that even though the “singular” case concerns only a small fraction of all belief and probability measures,
in many practical application there is a bias towards some particular models which are the most exposed to the problem.
For example, uncertainty is commonly represented using a fuzzy membership function [31]. If the membership function
has only a finite number of values, then it is equivalent to a belief function whose focal sets are linearly ordered under set
inclusion A1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ An = , |Ai| = i, or consonant belief function [38,25]. In that case, at most one focal element A1 is a
singleton. So, the vast majority of the useful information in the b.b.a. is contained in the non-singleton focal elements.
Relative belief is in fact only one element of an entire family of probability transformations. Indeed, b˜ can be thought of
as the transform which, given a belief function b:
(1) retains the focal elements of size 1 only, yielding an unnormalized belief function;
(2) computes (indifferently) the latter’s relative plausibility/pignistic transformation:
b˜(x) =
∑
A⊇x,|A|=1 mb(A)∑
y
∑
A⊇y,|A|=1 mb(A)
= mb(x)
kmb
=
∑
A⊇x,|A|=1 mb(A)|A|∑
y
∑
A⊇y,|A|=1 mb(A)|A|
.
Following this scheme, a family of natural generalizations of the relative belief transform is obtained by, given an arbitrary
belief function b:
(1) retaining the focal elements of size s only;
(2) computing either the resulting relative plausibility ...
(3) ... or the associated pignistic transformation.
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Now, both alternatives (2) or (3) yield the same probability distribution. Indeed, the application of the relative plausibility
transform yields:
p(x) =
∑
A⊇{x}:|A|=s mb(A)∑
y∈
∑
A⊇{y}:|A|=s mb(A) =
∑
A⊇{x}:|A|=s mb(A)∑
A⊆:|A|=s mb(A)|A| =
∑
A⊇{x}:|A|=s mb(A)
s
∑
A⊆:|A|=s mb(A)
,
while applying the pignistic transform yields:
p(x) =
∑
A⊇{x}:|A|=s mb(A)|A|∑
y∈
∑
A⊇{y}:|A|=s mb(A)|A|
= s
∑
A⊇{x}:|A|=s mb(A)
s
∑
y∈
∑
A⊇{y}:|A|=s mb(A)
, (24)
i.e., the same result. The following natural extension of the relative belief operator is therefore well defined.
Definition 2. Given a belief function b : 2 → [0, 1] with b.b.a. mb, we call relative mass transformation of b of level s the
transform M˜s[b] which maps b to the probability distribution (24).
We denote by m˜s the output of the relative mass transform of level s.
4.3. Classical probability transformations as convex combinations of relative mass transformations
It is easy too see that both relative plausibility of singletons and pignistic probability are convex combinations of all the
(n) relative mass probabilities {m˜s, s = 1, ..., n}. Namely, let us denote by kb,s = ∑A⊆:|A|=s mb(A) the total mass of focal
elements of size s, and by plb(x; s) = ∑A⊇{x}:|A|=s mb(A) the contribution to the plausibility of x of the same size-s focal
elements.
Immediately,
∑
y
plb(y) =
∑
y
∑
A⊇{y}
mb(A) =
∑
A⊆
mb(A)|A| =
n∑
r=1
r
⎛
⎝ ∑
A⊆,|A|=r
mb(A)
⎞
⎠ = n∑
r=1
rkb,r .
Therefore we obtain for the relative plausibility of singletons the following convex decomposition into relative mass proba-
bilities m˜s:
p˜lb(x) = plb(x)∑
y plb(y)
=
∑
s plb(x; s)∑
r rkb,r
= ∑
s
plb(x; s)∑
r rkb,r
= ∑
s
plb(x; s)
skb,s
skb,s∑
r rkb,r
= ∑
s
αsm˜s(x), (25)
as m˜s(x) = plb(x;s)skb,s , whose coefficients
αs = skb,s∑
r rkb,r
∝ skb,s =
∑
y
plb(y; s)
measure for each level s the total plausibility contribution of the focal elements of size s. In the case of the pignistic probability
we get:
BetP[b](x) = ∑
A⊇{x}
mb(A)
|A| =
∑
s
∑
A⊇{x},|A|=s
mb(A)
s
= ∑
s
1
s
∑
A⊇{x},|A|=s
mb(A)
= ∑
s
1
s
plb(x; s) =
∑
s
kb,s
plb(x; s)
skb,s
= ∑
s
kb,sm˜s(x),
(26)
where the coefficients βs = kb,s measure for each level s the mass contribution of the focal elements of size s.
4.4. Relative mass transforms as low-cost proxies
Accordingly, the relative mass probabilities can be seen as basic components of both the pignistic and the plausibility
transform, associated with the evidence carried by focal elements of a specific size.
As such transforms can be computed just by considering size-s focal elements, they can also be thought of as low-cost proxies
for both relative plausibility and pignistic probability, since only the
(
n
s
)
size-s focal elements (instead of the initial 2n) have
to be stored, while all the others can be dropped without further processing.
We can think of two natural criteria for such an approximation of p˜l, BetP via the relative mass transforms:
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Fig. 4. Left: The original belief function in the first scenario discussed in the text. Right: corresponding profile of both relative plausibility of singletons and
pignistic probability.
• (C1) we retain the component swhose coefficient αs/βs is the largest in the convex decomposition (25)/(26);• (C2) we retain the component associated with theminimal size focal elements.
Clearly, the relative belief transformation coincides with this second approximation if
∑
x mb(x) = 0. When the mass of
singletons is nil, instead, the second criterion delivers a natural extension of the relative belief operator:
b˜ext(x)
.=
∑
A⊇{x}:|A|=min mb(A)
|A|min∑A⊆:|A|=min mb(A) . (27)
The two approximation criteria favor different aspects of the original belief function. (C1) focuses (in two different ways) on
the strength of the evidence carried by focal elements of equal size. Note that the optimal (C1) approximations of plausibility
and pignistic transform are in principle distinct:
sˆ[p˜l] = arg max
s
skb,s, sˆ[BetP] = arg max
s
kb,s.
The best approximation of the pignistic probability is not necessarily the best approximation of the relative plausibility of
singletons. Criterion (C2) favors instead the precision of the pieces of evidence that make up the belief function b. Let us
compare these two approaches in two simple scenarios.
While (C1) is (at least superficially) a sensible, rational principle (the selected proxy must be the greatest contributor to
the actual classical probability transformation), (C2) seems harder to justify. Why should one retain only the smallest focal
elements, regardless their mass?
The attractive feature of the relative belief of singletons, among (C2) approximations, is its simplicity: the original mass is
directly re-distributed onto the singletons. What about the “extended” operator (27)?
Consider a scenario in which we want to approximate the plausibility/pignistic transform of a belief function b : 2 →
[0, 1], with b.b.a.mb(A) = mb(B) = , |A| = |B| = 2, andmb() = 1−2  mb(A) (Figure 4-left). Its relative plausibility
of singletons is given by:
p˜lb(x) ∝ mb(A) + mb(), p˜lb(y) ∝ mb(A) + mb(B) + mb(),
p˜lb(z) ∝ mb(B) + mb(), p˜lb(w) ∝ mb() ∀w = x, y, z.
Its pignistic probability reads instead as:
BetP(x) = mb(A)
2
+ mb()
n
, BetP(y) = mb(A) + mb(B)
2
+ mb()
n
,
BetP(z) = mb(B)
2
+ mb()
n
, BetP(w) = mb()
n
∀w = x, y, z.
Both transformations have a profile similar to that of Figure 4-right (when assuming mb(A) > mb(B)). Now, according to
criterion (C1), the best approximation (among all relativemass transformations) of both p˜lb and BetP[b] is given by selecting
the focal elements of size n, i.e., , as the greatest contributor to both the convex sums (25) and (26).
However, it is easy to see that this yields as an approximation the average probability p(w) = 1/n ∀w ∈ , which carries
no information at all. In particular, the fact that the available evidence supports to a limited extent the singletons x, y and z
is completed discarded, and no decision is possible.
If, on the other hand, we operate according to criterion (C2), we end up selecting the size-2 focal elements A and B. The
resulting approximation is
m˜2(x) ∝ mb(A), m˜2(y) ∝ mb(A) + mb(B), m˜2(z) ∝ mb(B),
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Fig. 5. Left: The belief function of the second scenario. Right: corresponding profile of both relative plausibility of singletons and pignistic probability.
m˜2(w) = 0 ∀w = x, y, z. The latter has the same profile as that of p˜lb or BetP[b] (Figure 4-right): the decision made
accordingly corresponds to that made based on p˜lb or BetP[b].
We can conclude that, at least in some situations, m˜2 = b˜ext is the best approximation of both plausibility and pignistic
transforms in a decision-making sense: we end up making the same decision, at a much lower (in general) computational
cost.
Consider however a second scenario, in which a belief function has only two focal elements A and B, with |A| > |B| and
mb(A)  mb(B) (Figure 5-left). Both relative plausibility and pignistic probability have the following values:
p˜lb(w) = BetP(w) ∝ mb(A) w ∈ A, p˜lb(w) = BetP(w) ∝ mb(B) w ∈ B,
and correspond to the profile of Figure 5-right. In this second case, (C1) and (C2) generate the uniform probability on the
elements of A (asmb(A)  mb(B)) and the uniformprobability on the elements of B (as |B| < |A|), respectively. Therefore, in
this scenario it is (C1) that yields the best approximation of both plausibility and pignistic transforms in a decision-making
perspective.
The second scenario corresponds to a situation in which the evidence is highly conflicting. In such a case we are given
two opposite decision alternatives, and it is quite difficult to saywhich onemakesmore sense. Shouldwe privilege precision
or evidence support?
Some insight on this issue comes from recalling that higher-size focal elements are expression of “epistemic” uncertainty
(in Smets’ terminology), as they come frommissing data/lack of information on the problem at hand. Besides, by their own
nature they allow less resolution for decision making (in the second scenario above, if we believe to the result of (C1) we
are left uncertain on whether to pick one of |A| outcomes, while if we believe in (C2) the uncertainty is restricted to |B|
outcomes). In conclusion, it is not irrational, in case of conflicting evidence, to favor precision over evidence support. This
amounts to choosing the approximation criterion (C2), which ultimately supports the case for the relative belief operator
and its natural extension (27).
5. Conclusions
In this paper we discussed the rationale of the relative belief transform in both the probability-bound and Dempster-
Shafer interpretations of belief functions. Even though neither the relative belief of singletons nor the relative plausibility
of singletons are consistent with the original belief function, an interesting rationale in terms of optimal strategies in a non-
cooperative game can be attached to suchmappings when one assumes a belief function is a set of probability distributions.
Weproved that relative belief commuteswithDempster’s orthogonal sum,meets a number of propertieswhich are the duals
of those met by the relative plausibility of singletons, and commutes with convex closure in a similar way as Dempster’s
rule does, supporting the argument that relative plausibility and belief transform are indeed naturally associated with the
D-S framework, and highlighting a classification of probability transformations into two families. To address the issue of its
limited applicability, we pointed out that relative belief is just a member of a class of relative mass transformations, which
can be interpreted as low-cost proxies for both plausibility and pignistic transforms.
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